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Abstract: 
The current study draws on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to 
examine what determines employees’ pension participation in China. For the purpose 
of exploring which employees actually receive pension coverage and why, 
econometric analysis was conducted with China’s Employer-Employee Matched 
Survey data (N=3412). A variety of both individual factors, ranging from age and 
Hukou status to job characteristics, and macro factors, including interprovincial 
migration and level of economic development, are all found to predict insurance 
coverage. Qualitative research results contextualize these findings by discussing the 
often ambivalent and triangulated relations among employers, employees and 
government. These three groups primarily use shared core policy beliefs to structure 
their interactions in the form of advocacy coalitions. Various types of cross-coalition 
interaction, including negotiation, cooperation and conflict, are examined. These 
findings carry both theoretical and policy implications. 
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1. Introduction 
Among all of the social welfare schemes in China, the old-age pension system is 
the one that involves the largest share of resources and the second largest proportion 
of the population. The latest data show that in 2014, 255 million employees were 
covered by the Urban Employee Pension Scheme (UEPS), the major public pension 
program in China, and 2531 billion￥was collected as UEPS funds (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, 2014), which amounted to almost 4% of the 
entire GDP for that year. As a result, it has attracted growing attention from employers 
and employees, often preoccupied the media and garnered increased interest by 
academics.  
China’s pension system has set about to achieve far-reaching structural reforms 
in recent years. The central government has been quite active in promoting new 
pension programs and related policies to extend pension coverage, which is reflected 
in new legislation such as the Labor Contract Law (2008) and Social Insurance Law 
(2011). Given this rapid expansion of national laws and policies, a pension framework 
which could cover the whole population has already been constructed in China (Guo, 
2014). Despite persistent stratification across the various fragmented schemes, within 
each separate pension scheme, everyone is entitled to the same rights. 
In reality, considering the overall size of the country and prevailing regional 
differences, the existence of a gap in the implementation of pension policies is 
unsurprising. For instance, even urban employees, who are the traditional 
beneficiaries of social insurance programs, have not been entirely covered by state 
pensions. The Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security reveals that, as of 2014, of the 393 million employees in urban areas 255 
million had joined the Urban Enterprise Pension Program (MOHRSS, 2015), which 
means almost 35% of urban employees are not covered by a statutory pension. By 
way of comparison, this coverage rate is much lower than Hong Kong, where only 3% 
of the entire working population is not covered by any public pension programs (Chan 
& Guo, 2011). Furthermore, at the international level, all OECD countries have set up 
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mandatory or quasi-mandatory pension plans, either public or private, to achieve 
quasi-universal coverage (OECD, 2013).  
Developing economies tend to possess less mature institutional systems, which 
are often characterized by weak enforcement of labor contracts and government 
policies (Chen & Wu, 2014). Studies on the labor market in developing economies 
tend to indicate that formal sectors (mostly referring to State/Public-owned firms and 
foreign-owned firms) experience more thorough and effective policy implementation 
than informal sectors (Nyland, Thomson & Zhu, 2011; Xu, Guan & Yao, 2011), and 
that this is usually reflected by a positive wage premium of the former group over the 
latter.  
Adequate pension coverage for employees in China remains an ongoing 
challenge. Successfully extending pension coverage among enterprises and employees 
requires a coordinated effort that respects and accounts for established regulations, 
ensures employer compliance and elicits individual employees’ cooperation. The 
article is primarily addressed to the following research questions: how do 
institutional-and individual-level differences explain the factors that determine 
employees’ pension participation? How do employer, employee and government 
actors respond to efforts to extend pension coverage? How can we understand the 
mutual and intertwined relations among them, and under what circumstances do they 
result in advocacy coalitions?  
Mixed methods were applied in this study. Utilizing the recent China 
Employer-Employee Matched Survey and accompanying qualitative data, the current 
study examines the socioeconomic and institutional determinants of employees’ 
participation in pension insurance. Further, the study also drew on qualitative insights 
to expand upon and contextualize the quantitative findings. Guided by the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF), which “provides the most useful tool for aggregating the 
behavior of the hundreds of organizations and individuals involved in a policy 
subsystem over periods of a decade or more” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 196), it 
pointed to dyadic relations permeated with ambivalence and triangulation among 
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employers, employees and government (Weible et al. 2011). Thus, based on empirical 
data, the current study analyzes both how actors form coalitions and the cooperation 
and conflicts that occur among coalitions, and it highlights important policy 
implications for understanding the phenomenon of pension participation. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The second section 
describes and applies the ACF to the case of China, reviews recent pension reforms 
and summarizes recent empirical findings. The third section introduces methodology 
and data sources. The fourth and fifth sections present the quantitative and qualitative 
research results sequentially. The final section summarizes key conclusions regarding 
the nature of the tripartite relationship among enterprises, employees and the 
government, and discusses policy implications. 
 
2. The Research Background and Existing Research 
2.1 The Policy Evolution  
The first pension system was established in 1951 in the form of Labor Insurance, 
which was available to eligible urban employees and staff employed in state-owned, 
joint state-privately operated, privately-operated, or cooperative factories and mines 
(Chow, 2000, p.142). A product of a centrally planned economy, the traditional social 
security system, which focused on formal sectors in cities, became increasingly 
inefficient and inadequate as market-oriented economic reforms unfolded (Guan, 
2000; Leckie, 1999; West, 1999). One of the major challenges associated with this 
transformation is that, the large flow of rural-to-urban migrant employees, who lack 
an urban Hukou (Household Registration Record), cannot participate in the Urban 
Enterprise Pension Scheme, the major public pension program designed for 
employees. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Chinese government began trying to develop a 
more pluralistic, effective and affordable social security system that was more 
compatible with both a thriving market economy and a flagging socialist political 
structure (Leung, 2003). The urban employee pension system went through several 
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major reforms since then. The pension reform in 1997 established a framework for 
developing a holistic urban employee pension scheme, including criteria for 
determining pension eligibility, benefits and contribution rates, etc. The 1999 
employment-based social insurance reform conducted by the Ministry of Labor was 
ground-breaking in that, for the first time, social welfare programs were made 
available for rural-to-urban migrant employees (Xu, Guan, & Yao, 2011).  
In 2008, a new Labor Contract Law (LCL) was enacted to protect the rights and 
interests of employees. The LCL has two central goals: to enforce the signing of 
contracts between employers and employees and to broaden social insurance coverage 
for employees (Gao, Yang & Li, 2011). In 2010, the central government issued the 
Social Insurance Law, which specifies rules governing the Basic Pension. In 
particular, Article 10 of this law requires that all employees should be offered basic 
pension insurance coverage through the Urban Employee Pension Scheme (UEPS), 
which is to be jointly funded by employers and employees. Moreover, the government 
introduced other initiatives to increase pension coverage and portability1  (Guo, 
2014).  
Although the Chinese government has achieved considerable progress in pension 
reform, the larger system remains both incomplete and inadequate. Indeed, the issue 
of pension portability, which pertains to ones’ ability to transfer funds between 
different localities and schemes, is as yet far from resolved (Guo, 2014). Additionally, 
the expected contribution rates of employers and employees are much higher in China 
than they are in other nations, exceeding what is recommended by the World Bank 
(Holzmann, et al., 2005, p. 56). These are all barriers impeding the integration of 
companies and individuals into the pension system. 
 
2.2 Findings from Existing Empirical Research 
                                                             
1 Including the New Rural Pension Scheme in 2009, Interim Measures for Pension Transfer within Urban Pension 
System in 2009, Urban Resident Pension Scheme for non-employed urban residents in 2011, and Interim Measures 
for the Connection between the Urban and Rural Pension Systems in 2014 
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The recent literature contains several studies that have examined the 
determinants of social insurance participation among various segments of the Chinese 
population. Among these contributions, a number of researchers have focused on the 
gap in insurance coverage confronting rural-to-urban migrant employees (Nielsen, 
Nyland, Smyth, Zhang, & Zhu, 2005; Xu, Guan, & Yao, 2011). Meanwhile, other 
scholars have explored the challenges of insurance compliance from the employers’ 
point of view (Smyth, Nielsen, & Qian, 2009). 
 
Rural-to-Urban Migrant Worker Insurance Coverage 
In classifying this literature, we divided those studies focused on rural migrant 
workers into two groups: those based on data collected in the pre- versus post-Labor 
Contract Law period. Exemplary of the former, Nielsen et.al (2005) drew on a survey 
to shed light on the characteristics of those who receive social insurance. The results 
revealed that gender, past earnings, ties to the city to which the migrant had moved, 
the form of enterprise ownership in which the migrant worked and residential 
registration status were all found to predict participation. Xu, Guan and Yao (2011) 
found that individual factors, including lack of knowledge of welfare programs and of 
a willingness to participate, and macro-level factors, including type of employer and 
industry, were critical in determining migrant workers’ participation in welfare 
programs. Finally, using China Household Income Project migrant survey data from 
2007 to 2008, Gao, Yang and Li (2012) examined the association between migrant 
workers’ labor contract status and their social insurance participation.  
Following enactment of the LCL, Giles, Wang and Park (2013) highlighted the 
importance of the labor tax wedge1 and gender gap in determining social insurance 
participation through survey data prior to and following implementation of the 2008 
LCL. Min et al. (2013) found that a significant proportion of migrants do not 
participate in any old age insurance schemes. Those at greatest risk not to participate 
                                                             
1 Strictly speaking, social insurance contributions are not taxes. They are paid into individual and social pooling 
accounts to which workers may eventually have a claim. Nonetheless, we follow conventions in the international 
literature in referring to the ratio of the combined contribution to wages paid as the “tax wedge”. 
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included migrants who live in poorer households, who move cross the province and 
who work in private enterprise, small businesses, the construction sector and service 
industries.  
As alluded to above, the institutional barriers standing in the way of pension 
participation by rural migrant workers have gradually been reduced through intensive 
policy incentives and national laws enacted since 2008. The result is that distinctions 
based solely on the identity of rural migrant workers are able to explain less and less 
of the gap in insurance coverage.  
 
The Employers’ Perspective and Compliance 
Social security regimes must be underpinned by enforcement mechanisms that 
effectively compel employers to fulfill their contribution requirements (Nyland, 
Hartel, Thomson & Zhu, 2012). The design of these mechanisms is important because 
an employer’s perspective and capacity to participate greatly affects their insurance 
compliance. Nyland, Thomson and Zhu (2011) explored how employers respond to 
attempts by the State to manage social insurance behavior. They identified five 
concerns expressed by employers based on their perceptions of and responses to 
policies and regulations: construction of an effective policy, level playing field, cost 
control, firm reputation, and recruitment and retention. Chen and Wu (2014), who 
investigated the relationship between industrial agglomeration and employer 
compliance with required pension contributions, found that in more agglomerated 
industrial areas, firms were more likely to comply with pension mandates. 
To summarize, previous empirical studies demonstrate that individual factors, 
including gender, past earnings, ties to the city, and a lack of willingness to participate 
are critical in determining employees’ participation in welfare programs. The same 
can be said for macro-level factors that include: type of employer and industry, 
presence of a labor contract, and various enterprise features etc. Nevertheless, given 
that the government has issued a host of key directives in recent years, there is a need 
for updated research to address the dynamics underlying the desirability of pension 
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insurance; specifically employees’ demographic characteristics, work-related 
information and subjective preferences, and disparities across various types of 
employers. This study uses survey data to describe the situation following the 
implementation of key pension policies in order to examine both employee treatment 
as well as the mechanisms underlying the perspectives and behavior of major 
stakeholders.  
 
3. The Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
In reality, the transformation of policy goals into action ultimately depends upon 
the interaction of a multitude of actors with often separate interests and strategies. 
Therefore, the current study utilizes the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), 
which is a policymaking framework developed to understand problems that arise in 
the policy process (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 2007), to 
understand how these separate but mutually dependent actors respond to the unfolding 
pension policies and institutional hurdles. 
The ACF is an overarching lens through which to understand and explain the 
nature of goal disagreement and technical disputes involving multiple policy 
stakeholders from government, interests groups, academia, and the media. Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1999) indicate that advocacy coalitions are composed of people 
from various governmental and private organizations that both (1) share a set of 
normative and causal beliefs and (2) engage in a nontrivial degree of coordinated 
activity over time (p. 120). The ACF has proven to be one of the more useful public 
policy frameworks (Johns, 2003), although it can be criticized for, among other things, 
seeming to neglect the social and historical context in which change occurs (Weible et 
al., 2011). In particular, ACF is generally used to understand policy formulation in the 
context of democratic political systems (see e.g. Litfin, 2000).  
However, in China, the government normally plays an overwhelming decisive 
role in the stage of policy formulation and decision making. It is usually the 
governmental staff’s responsibility to develop policy alternatives for dealing with 
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issues on the public agenda, and then higher level officials or power elites make the 
final decisions (Guo, 2013). Consequently, policy formation-pension reform being 
exemplary-appears to be quick, straightforward and “efficient” process. The ACF is 
particularly useful in the Chinese context because it allows us to attempt to explain 
the political behavior of actors in the policy process, which is often overlooked in 
China. In particular, ACF provides researchers a theoretical lens for organizing actors 
into coalitions by offering a set of hypotheses for explaining coalition structure and 
behavior (Weible & Sabatier, 2011 ). 
Long-term coalition opportunity structures relate to overlapping societal 
cleavages and the degree of consensus needed for major policy change. Our study 
relates to the emerging areas of policy subsystem interdependencies and coordination 
within, and between, coalitions. In exploring what determines employee pension 
participation in China, we believe that there are both micro factors (based on 
individual ‘choice’) and macro factors that pertain to the behavior of relevant policy 
coalitions. Neither of these are, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive as individuals 
make choices within social constraints. The ACF offers insights for understanding 
both why and how employees decide to participate (and how this decision is 
institutionally constrained), and how coalitional partners interact to affect policy 
implementation and the participatory decisions of employees. 
There are several hypotheses directly associated with the ACF. While none of 
them are directly transferable to the Chinese pension context, several of them 
indirectly inform the two main hypotheses proposed in this study. In particular, we 
expect that efforts will be made to preserve the core of the pension program but that 
compromises will occur around secondary issues. We also believe that within a 
coalition, administrative agencies will usually advocate a more moderate position than 
their interest-group allies. Specifically, we believe that mid-level administrators, who 
are a bridge between local employers and the central government, may exhibit 
flexibility in policy implementation. Further, consistent with ACF, we expect that 
elites of purpose groups are more constrained in their expression of beliefs and policy 
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positions than elites from material groups, employers have clear material concerns 
that they share with employees, and that mid-level government officials have a 
purposive mission that conflicts with economic exigencies. Finally, ACF notes that 
actors who share policy core beliefs are more likely to engage in short-term 
coordination if they view their opponents as (1) very powerful, and (2) very likely to 
impose substantial costs upon them if victorious. We believe that this could be the 
case for mid-level government officials, employers and employees.  
Based on existing research inquiries and the theoretical expectations raised in the 
ACF, two major assumptions are proposed: 1). certain factors, including policy 
contextual and institutional factors (geographical locations, enterprise ownership, 
Hukou etc.), and employees’ demographic and work-related characteristics (gender, 
educational level, income, marital status, health, contract, income, position, etc.) will 
affect urban employees’ pension participation; 2). At the policy implementation stage, 
in line with relevant law and regulations, employee’s pension insurance usually 
requires the participation of both employers and employees; therefore, the 
government, employers and employees naturally form three major coalitions, among 
which, negotiations and conflicts coexist.  
 
4. Mixed Method and Data Description  
This research study adopted a mixed methods approach, combining both 
quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry. Specifically, the quantitative portion of 
the study aims to respond to the first hypothesis. Qualitative insights were drawn on 
to expand upon and contextualize the quantitative findings to shed light on the second 
research assumption. Data collection and analysis were carried out sequentially. The 
researchers began by conducting the qualitative phase of the study in order to 
formulate grounded research questions. The results of these inquiries were then 
incorporated into the survey in the quantitative phase of the study. Finally, the 
researchers conducted semi-structured interviews to help explain, interpret and 
expand upon the quantitative findings. 
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The quantitative data used in this article were part of the “2013 China 
Employer-Employee Matched Survey”1, an anonymous survey conducted in 12 cities 
across China. The sampling process involved a systematic approach and a three-step 
scheme. First, 12 cities were selected through purposive sampling, including Beijing 
(east), Guangzhou (southeast), Suzhou (southeast), Fuzhou (southeast), Jinan (middle), 
Xiangyang (middle), Zhengzhou (middle), Chengdu (southwest), Changchun 
(northeast), Qiqihaer (northeast), Taiyuan and Xianyang (northwest). These cities are 
representative of China’s diverse geographic and urban composition. Second, the 
sampling frame in each city was constructed using the business directory based on the 
2008 National Economics Census after which, firms were chosen through a process of 
stratified sampling. Finally, employees at each company, including front line workers, 
skilled workers, and managers, were recruited via population proportion sampling. 
The basic profile of study respondents is shown in Table 1.  
In order to develop, refine and answer the research questions to allow us to 
understand patterns of interaction and negotiation among the various actors, we 
conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with employees, entrepreneurs/ 
human resource managers, scholars, and governmental officials between 2012 and 
2014. In terms of our sample, we chose: six officials from different levels of 
government (working in the MoHRSS and at the Beijing municipal, district, and street 
levels; five scholars working on social security; twelve employees (including rural 
migrant employees), both male and female between the ages of 18-60, who have been 
working in cities at least 6 months (and planned to keep working in cities), and come 
from different vocations, statuses and income levels; and, six enterprise HR 
managers/owners responsible for employee insurance.  
 
5. The Quantitative Analysis 
Utilizing China Employer-Employee Matched Survey data, this section 
investigates factors believed to influence UEPS participation. As discussed in section 
                                                             
1This survey was conducted by the School of Labor and Human Resources of Renmin University of China. The 
first author and the third author participated in the process of questionnaire design and revision. 
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2, the aim of universal UEPS coverage implies that individual demographic variables 
will not exhibit a strong correlation with participation rates. However, if pension 
participation rates are also in part the result of market-based mechanisms, such as a 
wage bargaining process, variables reflecting both the productive factors of the 
employees and the associated job information should exhibit strong explanatory 
power. In particular, a substitution effect between the pension participation outcome 
and cash income in the wage profile would appear significant controlling for other 
conditions. 
 
5.1 Econometric Methodology  
The outcome of an employee’s pension participation status will be modeled by using 
logit regressions. The baseline specification of the latent process is written as  
Pension𝑖
∗ = 𝛼′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝐻𝑢𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜂𝐹𝑖
+ 𝜖𝑖 
Where Pension* represents the latent propensity for an individual employee, I being 
selected into the state pension scheme. X indicates a vector of the individual’s 
characteristic variables, including gender (Male), marital status (Marriage), 
self-reported health condition (Health), education level and age. In particular, two 
dummies were introduced to capture secondary (Secondary Education) and tertiary 
(Tertiary Education) education. As mentioned before, if pension participation is 
implemented via market-based mechanisms (such as a wage-profile bargaining 
process), a higher education level will be associated with a greater likelihood of 
pension participation. For the age variable, we include a quadratic term to capture the 
effect of the policy requirement that the state pension fee must be paid for at least 15 
years.  
Two variables are integrated to capture an employee’s Hukou status. An Urban 
Hukou dummy is included to capture the historical advantage of the fact that the state 
pension was initially established only for urban Hukou employees.. The other dummy 
variable (Working in the Same Province) assumes the value of one if the employee’s 
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Hukou is located within the same province as the work place. This accounts for the 
current policy requirement that the pension fund be maintained separately at the 
provincial level. 
B represents a vector of variables capturing information about the employee’s 
current job. Specifically, A Firm Size variable, measured as the total number of 
employees, will capture the firm-level characteristics. A Skilled Position dummy is 
added based on whether the employee’s job position is managerial, administrative, 
skilled or professional in nature. A Contract dummy variable represents whether an 
employment contract has been signed or not. This variable is expected to indicate a 
relatively stronger employee bargaining position and to yield a positive coefficient. 
Another dummy (Negotiable Contract), indicating whether the signed contract is 
negotiable, has also been included. This accounts for contracts that are either directly 
negotiable with the employer or collectively drafted by the labor union. Two dummy 
variables are controlled to distinguish the ownership status of the employee’s current 
firm: Public-Owned Firm and Foreign-Owned Firm.  
Cash Income is constructed as the logarithmic monthly average cash income one 
year prior to the survey (i.e. in the year 2012). This may exclude those employees 
who entered a new job position within the previous year. In order to enrich the sample 
coverage, a logarithmic income variable set to one month prior to the survey has been 
utilized whenever the former measure is unavailable. 1 Moreover, some outlier 
observations tend to exhibit measurement errors in the sense that they are inconsistent 
with the job descriptions in other measures of the survey.2 Thus, all the analyses will 
exclude the top and bottom quantiles.  
F represents general factors denoting the employee’s geographical location. Two 
alternative variables will be employed, one of which is the city’s logarithmic GDP per 
capita and the other is a set of city dummies. These variables aim to capture other 
                                                             
1Regressions with the former definition have been conducted as robustness check and show no much qualitative 
difference. 
2 Excluding those outlier observations does not substantively change the results but would rule out obvious 
measurement errors. Due to space limitations, results including those outliers are excluded but are available upon 
request. 
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general factors that may introduce city-level heterogeneity that impacts pension 
participation rates.  
Standard errors are clustered at firm level to capture the with-in group 
correlations. An alternative regression strategy to capture multi-level heterogeneity is 
to implement mixed-logit model. The random effects are introduced at both firm- and 
city- levels. As shown in baseline results in the next section, the result suggests that 
variables employed in our baseline logit model are sufficient to capture the multilevel 
variations. We also did the correlation before the regression analysis, and the results 
are presented in Table 2, 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
5.2 Econometric Analyses 
 The baseline regression results are presented in the upper panel of Table 3 while 
the lower panel shows the average marginal effects of variables of key interest. It can 
be seen from Column 1 that the coefficients for the male and marriage dummies as 
well as self-reported health indicator variables are insignificant, implying that the 
state pension scheme does not exhibit selection effects related to these demographic 
conditions. 
Employee’s age exhibits a significant negative quadratic effect as expected. 
Specifically, the age exhibiting the greatest propensity to participate in pensions is 
about 43.6 (=0.202/2*0.002). This is consistent not only with the life-cycle 
expectation that younger-aged employees are less willing to participate, but also with 
the policy requirement that the minimum pension payment should be at least 15 years. 
The coefficients for the education variables are significant, suggesting that 
highly-educated employees are positively selected into the pension scheme. 
Compared with primary school educational attainment and below, the probability of 
pension participation would be improved by 9 and 13 percent respectively by 
secondary or higher levels of education.  
The coefficient of the Urban Hukou variable is significant and positive across the 
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various specifications, implying the presence of Hukou discrimination against rural 
Hukou employees. The positive coefficient for the other Hukou variable is also highly 
significant, indicating that participation in the state pension scheme is geographically 
limited at the provincial level due to current fund management regulations.1 
Among the current job information variables, The Firm Size variable is 
significant and positive, indicating that larger scale firms have higher rates of pension 
coverage. The coefficient of the Contract variable is also significant, which indicates 
that contractual obligation is a positive predictor of pension participation. Moreover, 
the marginal effects suggest that there is an approximately 25% improvement in the 
pension participation rate if the employment contract fully covers all the employees as 
compared to those with no coverage. The largest of the marginal effects variables 
points to the importance of an effective legal system for enforcing state pension policy. 
The coefficients of the Negotiable Contract and Skilled Position variable are 
insignificant. 
Firms’ ownership structure was a significant predictor of an employee’s 
propensity to participate in pension insurance. Specifically, those employees in state- 
and publicly- owned firms were more likely to participate in the state pension than 
those in private firms, with more than 15% marginal probabilities. Employees in 
foreign-owned firms did not exhibit a significantly higher likelihood of pension 
participation than their fellow cohort in private firms. This is consistent with the 
expectation that state- and publicly- owned firms possess stronger traditions of social 
responsibility and closer coordination with the government.2 
The coefficient of the Cash Income variable is significant, reflecting a positive 
relationship with the propensity to participate. Regressions in Columns 3 repeat those 
in Column 1 and 2 but use only the previous year’s cash income data. Overall, the 
results exhibit only marginal differences. 
                                                             
1 By controlling the random effects (Column 3), the coefficient for Urban Hukou becomes insignificant but still 
positive while working in the same province is still a significant factor for pension participation. 
2 Before the 1990s, the majority of companies in China were SOEs, so the urban pension scheme was originally 
designed for SOEs mainly. 
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City-level heterogeneity was shown to contribute to participation rates. 
Regression shown in Column 1, which use city’s GDP per capita as variables, exhibit   
positive coefficients. This implies that areas with better economic performance tend to 
display, ceteris paribus, higher levels of pension coverage. Alternatively, the city 
fixed-effects dummies, shown in Column 2, had no substantive effects on the 
coefficients of the other variables. Moreover, the random effect coefficients in the 
mixed-logit model, shown in Column 3, are insignificant and the residual intra-class 
correlations for both levels tend to be moderately low. This suggests that our baseline 
logit models may sufficiently capture the multilevel variations. Since the fixed-effects 
model does marginally affect the results, but does so while consuming more degrees 
of freedom, the results for the following analyses will only use the GDP pc variable. 
[Table 3 Here] 
Regressions in Table 4 have similar specifications as those reported in Table 3 
but aim to further examine the various channels of pension participation across 
different types of firm ownership. Firm ownership and employee Cash Income 
variables are treated as interaction terms. An Annuity dummy variable is added into 
the regressions and is also interacted with type of firm ownership. As previously 
discussed, establishment of firm annuity schemes provide an alternative form of 
pension accessibility for employees in foreign-owned firms, which may result in 
similar job-sorting and substitution effects as those seen with the cash income variable. 
Meanwhile, recent policy developments prioritize participation in the state pension 
scheme over firm’s annuity schemes. Moreover, regressions incorporating another 
alternative measure of cash income, the logarithmic ratio of the Cash Income to the 
Minimum Wage of the city, devised as a further robustness check, are presented in 
column 3.  
It can be seen from Table 4 that state- and publicly- owned firms still exhibit a 
significantly higher propensity of pension participation than private firms, which may 
indicate a greater tendency toward coordination with the government and its’ policy 
implementation goals. Their interaction with cash income is significantly negative. 
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This implies a substitution effect with respect to pension participation and cash 
income within those employees’ overall wage-profiles. The magnitude of this 
interaction term’s coefficient is smaller than that of the Public-Owned Firm dummy, 
yet indicates a positive overall propensity toward participation.  
After controlling for the interaction variables, the statistical difference between 
the foreign-owned and private firms becomes significant. The cash income 
substitution effects also become significant, particularly when the income variable is 
scaled to account for the local city’s minimum wage level (shown in Columns 3 and 
4). Moreover, the negative coefficient of the annuity interaction variable is highly 
significant. This suggests that the annuity schemes may particularly serve as the 
alternatives to the state position scheme and exhibit more significant substitution 
effects. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
To summarize, age and education level exhibit selection effects on pension 
participation. Policy variables such as Hukou restrictions and labor contract 
enforcement exhibit a significant impact on pension coverage. Overall, cash income 
and annuity participation positively affects participation rates but they also entail 
substitution effects with respect to the likelihood of pension participation. State- and 
publicly-owned firms have significantly higher pension participation rates than other 
types of firms. Other factors, such as firm size and the level of city’s economic 
development, also impact the choice to participate in pensions. These findings are 
further elaborated and contextualized in the qualitative study findings discussed 
below. 
 
6. Qualitative Data Analysis 
This study uses the ACF to reveal the importance of recognizing the interaction 
between and among opposing advocacy coalitions. The ACF presumes that 
individuals are rationally motivated but are bounded by their imperfect information 
and limited ability to learn about, and comprehend, a complex world (Simon 1985). 
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Having cognitive constraints, individuals are limited by their capacity to acquire and 
learn new information. The ACF’s model of the individual envisions policy 
participants as being motivated to seek out like-minded allies and form advocacy 
coalitions. The ACF argues that people primarily use shared core beliefs about policy 
to structure their interactions into advocacy coalitions. Certainly, however, 
cross-coalition interactions occur as well. This section focuses on the negotiation, 
cooperation and conflicts that occur among these three major coalitions of employees, 
employers and the government1. 
6.1 The Government and Employees: To Protect or to Take Advantage?  
Interviews with employees revealed that not all of them considered pension 
insurance to be an entitlement or their participation to guarantee protection by the 
state. One major barrier to their participation lays in UEPS’s high contribution rate; 
the 28% overall rate (20% for employers and 8% for employees) is 8% higher than 
the average public pension contribution rate in 25 OECD countries (OECD, 
2013).The majority of employees we interviewed considered their urban pension 
payments to be substantial and some regarded it as unacceptable to contribute 8% of 
their wages to social insurance. 2 Beyond daily consumption requirements, they 
reported needing to save money for marriage, children, housing, caring for their 
parents, etc., and for those earning low-to-moderate wages, the pension fee was felt to 
be a particularly burdensome expense. Indeed, the regression results corroborated that 
expectation that income predicts pension participation. A second obstacle, related to 
the first, is that given the current cost of living, younger employees tend to care less 
about ‘nest egg’ considerations, postponing them until middle age. Finally, some 
interviewees did not trust in interprovincial transfers of their pension record and 
accumulated savings, preferring to opt out or not participate in schemes with which 
they were unfamiliar or that they distrusted.3 
                                                             
1 The ACF argues that, in any given policy subsystem, there will generally be two to five advocacy coalitions. 
2 Many local governments adopt a “'binding-style” of social insurance, usually referred to as the “Urban Four 
Insurance.” This includes medicine, pension, work injury, and unemployment insurance, or sometimes what is 
referred to as the “Urban Five” when it also includes maternity insurance. These four or five items together cost 
employers and employees nearly 40% of employees’ wages. 
3 This research finding closely resembles recent arguments made by Mark Frazier (2010). He has observed that: 
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Despite these barriers, the government expects an increasing number of 
employees, especially young employees, to enroll in UEPS in hopes that pension 
funds will remain solvent and be able to accommodate the growing number of future 
retirees. From an academic perspective, some of the scholars who were interviewed 
indicated that the current UEPS was constructed in the 1990s, with the purpose of 
addressing the immediate and short-term exigencies of the pension system at that time. 
They noted that in order to collect more funds quickly the premium ratio (contribution 
rate) was set relatively high. These pragmatic rationales, historical evolution of the 
pension system and socio-economic transformation of China have shaped the deep 
ambivalence that prevails in the relationship between the state and employees with 
respect to pension participation.   
 
6.2 Employees and Employers: Cooperation or Conflict?  
Given the exceedingly high contribution rates surrounding social insurance 
programs in China, it is understandable that, even if the government attempted to 
completely enforce the pension regulations in place, employers and employees would 
resist full compliance with those regulations. Of course, given the realities of 
governance in China, both in terms of the fragmented nature of government and 
sometimes contradictory goals of GDP-ism and social security—the basis of social 
stability—thorough enforcement is a practical impossibility. 
The quantitative analysis above, by controlling for employee and current 
employer information, revealed that cash income is substitutive to state pension 
participation for state-/publicly- owned firms (relative to the informal sector). 
Foreign-owned firms exhibited similar results but via supplementary pension 
participation. 1 This result was borne out and explained in interviews with HR 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“pension benefits now account for the single largest source of spending for local governments, and many of the 
taxes taken from employers and employees to fund these accounts have been misappropriated by local Social 
Insurance Agencies for development or other corrupt purposes. These missing funds create the danger of unrest 
and loss of trust in the government in the event that retiring workers cannot be paid the funds that were taken from 
their salaries throughout their working lives” (Frazier, 2010) 
1 This may be due to the historical policy restrictions that foreign firms were subjected to; specifically, a much 
higher cost to participate in the state pension scheme, which resulted in the establishment of supplementary 
pension funds. 
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managers and employees. They indicated that in reality, some firms negotiate with 
their employees in order to reach a consensus on social insurance provision. For 
instance, if an employee agrees to abandon their insurance entitlements, the firm will 
typically compensate the employee with cash. Alternatively, some employers would 
select key employees to participate in the UEPS as a form of bonus or staff welfare. 
However, this “employer-employee alliance” is not always stable and mutually 
beneficial. On some occasions, employees may be under intense employer pressure to 
relinquish insurance entitlements in exchange for a wage substitute, and may only do 
so reluctantly. Of course, when they realize their rights are being endangered, they 
could apply for labor arbitration. In most cases, the government would regard an 
“insurance evasion agreement” as illegal and require the firm to compensate the 
employee for lost insurance benefits.  
 
6.3 Who has More Bargaining Power? Ambivalence between Employers and 
Government 
Managing employer’s social insurance compliance is a particularly difficult 
governance challenge in emerging economies that have weak regulatory regimes 
(Nyland, Thomson & Zhu, 2011).This is an especially acute problem in China, which 
has aggressively pursued GDP-ism, requiring that the government maintain high 
levels of economic growth and strike a balance between job growth and social 
security.1Aware of the plight faced by small enterprises, local authorities began to 
turn a blind eye towards enforcement of social insurance policies. In principle, the 
government requires enterprises to join the urban pension scheme; in reality, 
government officials are quite flexible and even considerate of the needs of local 
employers. Indeed, enterprises that struggle to survive are sometimes relieved of their 
pension premium obligations by local bureaus. For example, during the economic 
recession that occurred in 2008-2009, many business owners complained and plead 
                                                             
1 One government official shed light on this reality: “if a medium-size company with 200 workers is required to 
pay pension insurance for all employees, this company then has to pay one million CNY per year on this single 
item without any return. This would be a substantial burden for middle and small sized enterprises.” CITE 
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with government officials to be released from pension requirements.  
However, as we alluded to above, should any employees apply for labor 
arbitration their case will in all likelihood be dealt with strictly according to 
government regulations. Employers would be required to compensate employees for 
their loss, and would be liable to a fine and subject to administrative warning. Given 
the relatively equal power that the parties have to influence the other, it is hard to 
conclude whether the government or the employer has the upper hand in this situation.  
 
7. Discussions and Implications 
Based on a very rapid and relatively recent expansion of national laws and 
policies, a pension framework capable of covering the whole working population in 
China has been launched. Despite substantial progress, in reality, owing to the size, 
diversity, developing nature of the economy and society, policy making mechanisms, 
and governance structure of the nation, for the foreseeable future, a considerable 
proportion of urban employees will remain inadequately covered by the pension 
scheme.  
Aiming to explore the reasons behind this reality, this study drew on China’s 
Employer-Employee Matched Survey data to shed light both on which employees are 
actually covered by pension insurance and why. In response to the first research 
hypothesis, a variety of micro- and macro-level factors were found to be statistically 
significant predictors of pension insurance coverage. The econometric model 
developed in this study substantiated that that cash income is a significant substitute 
for state pension participation, at least for state-/publicly- owned firms relative to 
those in the informal sector. Foreign-owned firms shared this pattern but through the 
slightly different mechanism of supplementary pension participation.  
In response to the second assumption, this study also drew on qualitative insights 
to expand upon and contextualize the quantitative findings. Guided by the ACF, it 
pointed to dyadic relations permeated with ambivalence and triangulation among 
employers, employees and government. Qualitative research findings indicated that 
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the fate of pension policy implementation is deeply intertwined in this triangular 
employer-employee-government relationship. Being largely subjected to existing 
policies and institutional arrangements, pension participation in China is 
fundamentally the result of complex interaction, collaboration and negotiation 
between governments, employers and employees. In this context, it is unclear who if 
anyone, has the upper hand in terms of bargaining and leverage at this point in time. 
Theoretically, the article shows that the ACF can be expanded beyond the 
western context to explain pension policy implementation in China, which is different 
from its original roots and applications in democratic regimes. In other words, 
although there seems to be less of a formal role for advocacy coalitions in the policy 
formation stage in China, in the policy implementation stage, different groups of 
stakeholders do appear to be expressing distinct identities, attitudes and strategies. 
While ACF is normally used to understand policy formulation in democratic political 
systems, this study argues that it has the potential to be developed and applied as a 
useful framework for understanding the complicated relations among stakeholders 
involved in pension policy implementation in China. 
With regard to policy implications, this study strongly suggests that the reason 
why ambivalence exists among employers and employees is that both have to choose 
among limited and largely unfavorable choices. If the government is committed to 
ensuring employer compliance and individual’s cooperation, they should recognize 
and take steps to overcome a series of institutional hurdles. The government should 
examine its policy enforcement tools and their effects, adjusting, where possible, 
relevant regulations to better accommodate the needs and capacities of enterprises and 
individuals.  
In sum, we consider that several important policy implications follow from this 
analysis. First, a central barrier to pension participation is confronted by 
low-to-moderate income employees and small-to middle- sized firms; that is, UEPS 
contributions are simply too arduous for many to afford. Among possible solutions 
that should receive serious consideration is lowering UEPS contribution requirements 
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by providing a moderate subsidy or allowance to support medium-sized and small 
enterprises.  
A second major barrier to participation relates to pension transfer issues. 
Although the government aims to address these problems, the UEPS remains 
fragmented at this stage of implementation. Foremost among the concerns of 
geographically mobile employees is that they may suffer pension loss when they 
relocate in pursuit of employment. Possible solutions include higher level pension 
fund management and the creation of a national pension (social security) information 
system to track benefit eligibility and accumulated contributions. Both are 
prerequisites to guarantee pension transfers and improve pension portability.  
Last but not least, it may appear at first blush that the state-led policy process in 
China should be quite “effective” and “efficient.” However, closer examination 
reveals that the policy making process in China, as elsewhere, suffers from limited 
information among a host of other sources or error that emerge in the form of  policy 
implementation failures over time. Accordingly, we consider that it is important to 
involve public participation earlier in the policy formation process. It is suggested that 
policy consultation, hearings, evaluation and other accountability mechanisms are 
needed in public policy making to generate a rational mechanism through which 
public opinions can be heard and conflicting interests reconciled. 
Despite the theoretical and practical implications discussed above, the current 
research has several limitations. First, our analyses were based on cross-sectional data 
and we cannot assert causality. Second, the quantitative findings rely on self-report 
data from the participants, which may carry common method biases; third, the ACF 
was rooted in the western democratic regime, so it cannot be perfectly applied in 
Chinese context. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (N=3,412) 
Age  Cash Income (RMB)  
   Young age (age≤35) 63.3%    Cash Income≤2000 41.6% 
   Mid age (35<age≤45) 28.0% 2000<Cash Income≤3000 37.5% 
   Old age (45<age≤60) 8.7% 3000<Cash Income≤4000 12.7% 
Gender  Cash Income>4000 8.2% 
   Male 45.1% Ownership  
   Female 54.9%    State-owned enterprise 18.1% 
Marital Status     Foreign-owned enterprise 4.5%  
   Married 67.1%    Private-owned enterprise 46.6% 
   Single 32.9% Corp. Ltd Firms 30.9% 
Education  Pension Status  
Elementary Education 35.5%    With Pension 72.6% 
Secondary Education 41.4%    Without Pension 27.4% 
   Tertiary Education 23.2% City   
Self-reportedhealth condition    Beijing 14.8% 
Very poor 0.1% Guangzhou 1.5% 
Poor 1.3% Chengdu 10.9% 
   Average 22.0% Jinan 12.8% 
   Good 61.0% Changchun 10.0% 
   Very good 15.5% Zhengzhou 11.0% 
Hukou  Fuzhou 11.1% 
   Urban 62.6% Taiyuan 0.5% 
   Rural 37.4% Suzhou 6.5% 
Locality  Qiqihaer 6.8% 
   From local Province 87.5% Xiangyang 6.5% 
From other Province 12.5% Xianyang 7.6% 
Skills  Contract Status  
   Skilled worker 47.9%    Contract signed 71.7% 
   Unskilled worker 52.1%    Contract not signed 28.3% 
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Table 2. Correlation of Variables  
 
Male Marriage Health Age 
Secondary 
Education 
Tertiary 
Educatioin 
Urban 
Hukou 
Working 
in the  
Same 
Province 
Firm 
Size 
Skilled 
Position Contract 
Negotiable 
Contract 
Public-Owned 
Firm 
Foreign-Owned 
Firm 
Male 1 
             Marriage 0.0108 1 
            Health 0.041 -0.1318 1 
           Age 0.0978 0.5548 -0.215 1 
          Secondary 
Education -0.055 -0.118 0.0405 -0.2141 1 
         Tertiary 
Educatioin -0.049 -0.1342 0.0475 -0.1831 -0.4609 1 
        Urban Hukou -0.049 0.1366 -0.0756 0.2183 0.02 0.2215 1 
       Working in the  
Same Province -0.032 0.1031 -0.0343 0.1221 0.0651 -0.0596 0.1243 1 
      Firm Size -0.0253 0.0255 -0.0461 0.0047 0.0158 0.1494 0.1373 -0.0174 1 
     Skilled 
Position 0.1179 0.0095 0.0168 -0.0344 0.0475 0.2051 0.0679 -0.0654 0.0862 1 
    
Contract -0.0228 0.002 -0.038 -0.0683 
0.13
83 
0.185
5 
0.1
127 
-0.0
598 
0.2
521 
0.1
498 1 
   Negotiable 
Contract 0.0093 -0.0322 0.0273 -0.0191 0.0564 0.0198 0.0159 -0.0039 0.0117 0.0493 0.3024 1 
  Public-Owned 
Firm 0.042 0.1127 -0.0587 0.089 0.0331 0.054 0.1855 0.1293 0.2531 0.0226 0.1802 0.0186 1 
 Foreign-Owned 
Firm -0.0129 -0.0633 0.0052 -0.0617 -0.0256 0.0869 -0.0035 -0.1204 0.1823 0.0062 0.0913 -0.006 -0.1016 1 
Cash Income 0.1822 -0.0179 0.017 -0.1117 0.0179 0.2888 0.1053 -0.1862 0.1386 0.3424 0.238 0.0486 -0.0183 0.1441 
lnGDPpc 0.0134 -0.134 -0.043 -0.1772 0.0707 0.171 -0.0616 -0.2854 0.0131 0.1254 0.3587 0.1551 0.0368 0.1095 
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Table 3. Pension Participation: Baseline Results 
 Dependent Variable: Pension (1 = Yes, 0=No) 
 Logit Regressions Mixed-Logit Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Individual Characteristics 
Male -0.206 -0.200 -0.262 
 
(0.135) (0.140) (0.170) 
Marriage 0.140 0.186 0.177 
 
(0.156) (0.173) (0.210) 
Health 0.067 0.037 0.093 
 
(0.096) (0.098) (0.120) 
Age 0.202*** 0.214*** 0.280*** 
 
(0.058) (0.069) (0.051) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Secondary Education 0.925*** 0.906*** 1.013*** 
 
(0.152) (0.151) (0.206) 
Tertiary Education 1.312*** 1.416*** 1.253*** 
 
(0.227) (0.227) (0.290) 
Hukou Status 
Urban Hukou 0.356** 0.443*** 0.183 
 
(0.149) (0.145) (0.183) 
Working in the 0.860*** 0.932*** 1.049*** 
Same Province (0.262) (0.252) (0.286) 
Information for Current job 
Firm Size 0.397*** 0.431*** 0.727*** 
 (0.109) (0.106) (0.158) 
Skilled Position 0.109 0.180 0.546*** 
 
(0.143) (0.143) (0.172) 
Contract 2.455*** 2.411*** 2.623*** 
 
(0.189) (0.191) (0.212) 
Negotiable Contract -0.091 -0.145 -0.237 
 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.225) 
Firm Ownership and Employees’ Cash Income 
Public-Owned Firm 1.644*** 1.506*** 1.654*** 
 
(0.433) (0.432) (0.465) 
Foreign-Owned Firm -0.034 -0.077 0.702 
 
(0.587) (0.571) (0.750) 
Cash Income 0.661*** 0.601** 1.035*** 
 
(0.254) (0.275) (0.285) 
Other City-Level Fixed Effects 
lnGDPpc 1.309*** 
 
2.245*** 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.537) 
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Constant  -27.746*** -12.582*** -43.825*** 
 
(3.595) (2.543) (6.480) 
Constant_City   0.239 
 
  (0.215) 
Constant_Firm   6.297*** 
 
  (1.100) 
CityDummies No Yes  
No. Obs 3412 3412 3412 
Pseudo-R^2 0.43 0.45  
Resid_ICC_City   0.024 
Resid_ICC_Firm   0.665 
Marginal Effects 
Secondary Education 0.095*** 0.090***  
 
(0.016) (0.015)  
Tertiary Education 0.135*** 0.141***  
 
(0.024) (0.023)  
Urban Hukou 0.037** 0.044***  
 
(0.015) (0.014)  
Working in the 0.089*** 0.093***  
Same Province (0.027) (0.025)  
Contract 0.253*** 0.240***  
 (0.017) (0.017)  
Public-Owned Firm 0.169*** 0.150***  
 
(0.045) (0.043)  
Foreign-Owned Firm -0.003 -0.008  
 (0.060) (0.057)  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard-errors clustered at firm level and *, **, *** denote 
significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Average marginal effects are presented in the lower panel 
and the unconditional standard errors are shown in the parentheses. Resid_ICC represents the 
residual intra-class correlations. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Substitution Between Pension and Cash Income 
Logit Regressions, Dependent Variable: Pension 
 
Income = Income Income = Income/MinWage 
 
Incl. 
 Corp. Ltd Firms 
Excl.  
Corp. Ltd Firms 
Incl. 
 Corp. Ltd Firms 
Excl.  
Corp. Ltd Firms 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Other Variable Results Omitted) 
Public Owned Firm 16.285*** 13.472** 4.379*** 3.929*** 
 
(5.748) (5.883) (1.438) (1.441) 
Foreign Owned Firm 10.497* 7.859 3.741*** 3.457** 
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(6.055) (6.165) (1.388) (1.457) 
Income 1.176*** 0.737** 1.615*** 0.942* 
 
(0.292) (0.355) (0.438) (0.528) 
Public Owned Firm * -1.919*** -1.521** -2.712** -2.044* 
  Income (0.734) (0.754) (1.219) (1.238) 
Foreign Owned Firm *  -1.315* -0.938 -3.063*** -2.506** 
  Income (0.760) (0.774) (1.117) (1.166) 
Annuity 2.513*** 2.703*** 2.488*** 2.681*** 
 
(0.348) (0.399) (0.350) (0.399) 
Annuity * -1.088 -1.249 -1.124 -1.282 
  Public Owned Firm (0.868) (0.893) (0.875) (0.899) 
Annuity * -2.179** -2.462*** -2.107** -2.396*** 
  Foreign Owned Firm (0.974) (0.954) (0.883) (0.865) 
No.Obs 2839 1964 2839 1964 
Pseudo-R^2 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 
Marginal Effects 
Public Owned Firm 0.143*** 0.173*** 0.151*** 0.180*** 
 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
Foreign Owned Firm 0.024 0.050 0.044 0.073 
 
(0.062) (0.067) (0.056) (0.062) 
Annuity 0.237*** 0.255*** 0.236*** 0.254*** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038) 
 
 
